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Abstract: 
This study tests the appropriateness of two competing hypotheses drawn from the public finance literature about 
the impact of municipal utility profits on local tax and spending patterns. By comparing data from cities that 
own their electric utilities to nonelectric cities, this research finds that neither city expenditures nor property tax 
rates are signifIcantly affected by the transfer of profits. The evidence suggests that the profits are used by cities 
with relatively weak tax bases to obtain revenues from tax-exempt institutions, homeowners, and nonresidents. 
 
Article: 
Municipal enterprises have begun to receive renewed attention in recent years.
1 
 In part, In part, this attention 
has resulted from the fiscal crisis of the cities that has developed over the past decade. Quite simply, municipal 
enterprises can be sources of substantial revenue for cities faced with declining tax bases, tax limitations, or 
federal grant reductions. Alternatively, those same enterprises can serve as a significant drain on city revenues if 
they are not fiscally self-supporting through user charges. Increasingly, cities are creating separate enterprise 
funds for such services, including water, sewer, electric, or gas utilities, as well as recreation services and refuse 
collection, among others.
2
 Thus, city officials have a growing concern for making enterprises pay for 
themselves, and, if possible, produce profits or surpluses. In many states, municipal enterprises, especially 
electric utilities, often do generate profits. The question is: How are these profits used by municipal 
governments? 
 
Two divergent hypotheses have been suggested in the literature. First, the availability of enterprise profits may 
produce an expenditure effect—i.e., the profits of the municipal enterprise may simply be used to finance higher 
levels of spending with no balanced reduction in other local taxes. Indeed, Colberg speculated that city 
expenditure levels would be higher in cities with municipal electric utilities than elsewhere due to the extra 
funds appropriated from utility profits.
3
 In testing this hypothesis, DiLorenzo found some evidence of such an 
expenditure effect in his analysis of a sample of New York municipalities. He concluded that: 
 
while it is possible that utility profits may be substituted for other local revenue sources, in the sample of New York municipalities 
studied internal subsidization is likely to have stimulated expenditures, leading to an increase in local tax collections.
4 
 
This, of course, would lead us to expect higher expenditure levels in cities with profitable municipal enterprises 
than cities without such enterprises. 
 
An alternate view would lead us to a very different expectation, however. This second hypothesis points to a 
revenue substitution effect as the main result of available enterprise profits—i.e., transfers of enterprise profits 
could be used as substitutes for other local revenue sources. Strauss and Wertz and Vogt examined cities prior 
to the eras of both the energy crisis and the tax revolt and found evidence of such a use of municipal electric 
utility profits in their studies of North Carolina cities.
5
 Nonetheless, their findings that property taxes were 
lower in cities with municipal electric companies might be especially relevant in examinations of municipal 
finance over the past decade as voters repeatedly expressed disenchantment with the property tax. Several 
studies have shown that other forms of municipal revenue have been used in the recent past to substitute for 
declining reliance on the property tax.
6
 Municipal utility profits might be employed in the same manner, leading 
to the expectation that reliance on other local revenue sources would be less in cities with profitable municipal 
enterprises than in cities without them. 
 
In this article, then, we test these two competing hypotheses about the use of municipal enterprise funds by 
analyzing the transfer of electric utility profits and their fiscal impacts in the case of Florida cities. The single 
state study of Florida was chosen not only for practical purposes, but also to minimize accounting, budgeting, 
and functional responsibility differences that become a thorny problem in cross-state research on municipal 
finances. In the first section, we examine city policies on utility profits and discuss the role of electric utility 
profits in city finances. This is followed by a study of actual fiscal data for two sets of Florida cities: those with 
and those without municipal electric utilities. In the final section, we examine an alternative way of looking at 
the use of utility profits by municipalities. The conclusion raises several questions about the fiscal impacts of 
utility profits on consumers as well as on city finances. 
 
ELECTRIC UTILITY PROFITS AND REVENUE TRANSFER POLICIES 
Traditional analyses of municipal utilities suggest that, in general, cities subsidize certain services, such as mass 
transportation, break even on others such as, water and sewer, and make a profit, if possible, on electric 
utilities.
7
 Obviously, only the last category of municipal enterprises offers substantial opportunities for tax 
substitution purposes or the improvement of other city service levels. However, these utility profits need not be 
used for either purpose.
8
 Rather, they could be used for at least two other purposes—to fund the utility's capital 
improvements or to subsidize the operation of other, less financially lucrative municipal enterprises. This 
assumes, of course, that city officials have little interest in reducing consumers' utility rates and thereby 
eliminate or decrease the profits. 
 
However, much of the profits of municipal electric utilities are usually added to the general fund, and, thus, 
create opportunities for tax substitution and the funding of higher service levels. For instance, in FY84, the 32 
Florida cities operating municipal electric utilities transferred a total of $69,905,713 out of their utility 
enterprise funds to the general fund for a mean transfer of $2,255,023.
9
 Such transfers are clearly sizable, 
comprising a mean per capita transfer of $74.91 and a mean utility customer transfer of $130.32. These figures 
comprise a mean of almost nine percent of the utilities' operating revenues and accounted for over seven percent 
of the general fund and other debt financing revenue of these cities.
10
 
 
These average figures, however, obscure important differences in transfer policies among cities. Indeed, the 
wide dispersion of transfer amounts across the cities indicates that the municipalities had differing transfer 
policies and practices. To examine this issue more systematically, we requested copies of the transfer policies of 
the 33 city- owned utilities in Florida. Twenty cities responded for a response rate of 61 percent. 
 
As might be expected, the cities do not have a standard approach to determining the amount of the annual 
transfer to the general fund, and some do not have a written policy but, rather, operate on an ad hoc basis from 
year to year. Still, several general patterns were discernable. 
 
First, several of the Florida cities use the traditional "in lieu of taxes" principle that provides an amount city 
government would receive if the utility were privately owned and subject to property and franchise fees. The 
consolidated government of Jacksonville, for example, receives payments from its utility authority using this 
approach, although the amount is negotiated between the city and the authority, and expressed in a per kilowatt 
hour rate. 
 
Second, other utilities transfer to the general fund the equivalent of a "reasonable profit" (usually around 6 
percent), such as that allowed by the state Public Service Commission for investor-owned utilities (IOU's) that 
distribute dividends from corporate earnings. The City of Vero Beach's version of this, however, is a 
contribution of 12 percent of the value of the electric plant on the principle of "return on investment." Third, 
some cities compute the transfer to be a fixed percentage of the revenues of the utility. For example, Lake 
Worth contributes up to 10 percent of gross revenues, while Fort Pierce transfers up to 40 percent of net 
revenues, thus ensuring an increasing amount as fuel costs rose during the 1970s and early 1980s, but resulting 
in a significant decrease more recently as fuel prices dropped.
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A fourth method focuses on the revenue needs of the general government, by specifying an amount based on the 
general government's expenditures. Tallahassee, for example, has recently stipulated that by 1990 its transfer 
should be 35 percent of the city's budgeted general expenditures—a reduction from the current 39 percent. The 
effort to reduce the percentage was stimulated by the concern for the financial viability of the utility as the city 
engages in an aggressive annexation strategy. As the city grows in size and the general fund expenditures 
increase, the transfer must also increase even though the utility's revenues are not expected to grow 
correspondingly. 
 
Of those cities with no firm policy (and even some that do), most simply arrive at an amount each year based on 
the financial needs of general government. The city managers and/or elected officials tend to make transfer 
decisions without much input from the utility managers, who generally seem to prefer to keep the size of the 
transfers low and predictable. These transfers can be planned in advance, during the budget review phase, or can 
take place during the fiscal year, as needs arise. Limits can be placed on such ad hoc transfers as well, but the 
temptation to use whatever is needed by general government is understandably substantial. In such cases, the 
utility profits are used as a contingency fund, with widely differing amounts of transfers across years. 
 
The City of Gainesville, for example, for several years had no specific formula For transfers beyond an amount 
in lieu of taxes and full reimbursement of indirect costs. In 1982, the city council placed a 3 percent limit on 
future increases in transfers from one year to the next. However, the limit may be exceeded by a majority vote 
of the city council following a public hearing. On several occasions, such votes were taken to raise the amount 
of the transfer significantly; the FY 86 budget included an approximately 20 percent increase over the previous 
year, as an alternative to increasing the property tax rate. Recently Gainesville, adopted a formula that transfers 
approximately 15 percent of the difference between gross revenues and gross fuel expenditures. 
 
Obviously, these different transfer policies offer different opportunities for using electric utility profits.
12
 In 
general, those relying simply on "in lieu of taxes" and "reasonable property taxes" of utility property as 
guidelines for transfers appear to transfer less than cities relying on the other transfer policies. More 
specifically, those with no overall transfer policy were least predictable in terms of the amounts actually 
transfered. Still, the wide mix and combinations of policies and the varied practices operative under them mean 
that we cannot discern how utility profits are actually used from an examination of stated policies alone. To 
fully discern the use of transferred utility profits, then, we must turn to an examination of the actual municipal 
finance data. 
 
TESTING FOR THE SUBSTITUTION AND EXPENDITURE EFFECTS 
How, then, do cities use excess municipal utility funds? As noted in the introduction, two general uses might be 
hypothesized. First, cities might use the fund transfers to finance higher levels of expenditures, without 
increasing other taxes. And second, cities could use fund transfers as a substitute for other local taxes, thus 
reducing taxes or preventing increases, without cutting expenditures. To begin to assess these hypothesized uses 
of fund transfers, we compared the finances of the 32 municipal electric utility cities of Florida to 35 randomly 
selected non-electric utility cities in Florida. The two groups of cities were found to be similar on a number of 
demographic characteristics not directly related to their fiscal condition—city size, form of government, 
percentage of the population on public assistance, and the percentage of the population receiving social security. 
However, the electric utility cities were found to have somewhat lower median income levels per capita than the 
nonelectric cities (t=2.04; significant at .05 level). In addition, the functional responsibilities for services of 
these cities did not vary significantly, since Florida's constitution does not encourage or allow much 
 
 
variation among population classes. (The major exception to this is the consolidated City of Jacksonville. See 
note 9.) 
 
The expenditure effect is the most easily evaluated by testing the hypothesis that expenditures in electric utility 
cities are higher than in cities without municipal utilities. If cities are using utility fund transfers to finance 
higher levels of expenditure, we should find support of this hypothesis. However, as seen in the first row of 
Table 1, we find little evidence confirming the hypothesis; there is not a statistically discernable difference in 
the per capita FY 84 expenditures of the two sets of cities. Indeed, the electric utility cities had somewhat lower 
levels of expenditure—$407.97 per capita—than the nonelectric cities which spent on average $415.16 per 
capita. Thus, in contrast to DiLorenzo's confirming test, these results provide little support for Colberg's 
hypothesis that utility profits are used to increase municipal expenditures. 
 
Does this then mean that utility profits are used as a substitute for taxes? We can evaluate the tax substitution 
hypothesis by examining the mean differences across the two sets of cities on a number of tax characteristics. 
And such comparisons provide some evidence for a substitution effect. As seen in the second row of Table 1, 
the FY 84 mean locally raised per capita tax burden (including the property tax, utility taxes, sales taxes, fees 
and fines) in electric cities was only $100.01 compared to $185.22 for the nonelectric cities, a difference that 
was significant at the .05 level. And this difference grew as city size increased. As seen in the third row of Table 
1, even though electric utility cities of all size classes raised lower amounts of revenue from their own sources 
(not including the utility transfer) than did nonelectric cities, for those cities over 20,000 population, the electric 
cities raised $127.05 per capita. In contrast, the non-electric cities in this population class raised $211.39 per 
capita in own-source local revenue, a difference that was significant at the .01 level. 
 
Because electric utility cities use utility transfers as a substitute for local taxes, they generally rely less on these 
revenue sources than do nonelectric utility cities. As seen in the fourth row of Table 1, locally-raised revenues 
comprised 37.36 percent of local FY 84 revenue in the nonelectric utility cities, but only 24.05 percent for the 
electric utility cities—a difference of 13.31 percent that is significant at the .01 level. Nearly half of this 
difference is made up of a lower reliance on the property tax. The nonelectric cities rely on the property tax, an 
average of 19.38 percent of total revenue, more than the electric utility cities, which average only 12.41 percent, 
as seen in the fifth row of Table 1. Although this difference of 6.03 percent was not statistically discernable, the 
resulting property tax revenues per capita were significantly different in the two sets of cities. While the average 
property tax burden in electric cities was $50.81 per capita, the amount was over twice that in nonelectric cities, 
$109.47, a figure that was significant at the .05 level, as indicated in the sixth row of Table 1. Thus, the electric 
cities raised lower levels of revenue through the property tax than did the nonelectric municipalities. 
 
At first glance, then, electric utility transfers appear to be used as a substitute for other local revenue, especially 
the property tax. That first impression changes sharply, however, when we examine average millage rates across 
the two sets of cities. That is, if transfers are used as a substitute for property taxes, we should find that property 
tax millage rates are lower in electric utility cities than in nonelectric utility cities. Yet, as seen in the seventh 
row of Table 1, no difference was found in the two sets of cities; both sets of cities had an average millage rate 
of 3.76, a relatively low millage rate—well below the state-mandated cap of 10 mills for city governments.
13 
Although in some states millage rates and assessments are manipulated by local officials to stay within state tax 
limitations, this does not appear to be a significant problem in Florida. Variations in local assessment practices 
and assessment/sales price ratios are comparatively narrow for Florida.
14 
Thus, while the electric utility cities 
relied on local property taxes to a much lesser extent than non-electric utility cities, there was no difference in 
the average property tax rates across the two sets of cities. In short, there does not seem to be a simple 
substitution of utility transfers for local property taxes as hypothesized. 
 
The failure to find either an expenditure effect or a simple revenue substitution effect leaves us with something 
of a mystery. What did the electric utility cities do with the transfer funds if they were not used to finance 
higher levels of expenditures or, alternatively, to reduce local property tax rates? And why would the per capita 
property taxes be significantly lower in the electric cities? The answer to this mystery lies in one important 
difference between the two sets of cities: the electric utility cities have a significantly lower mean value of 
taxable property as a proportion of total assessed property value than the nonelectric utility cities, in terms of 
both the actual totals for the two groups and the per capita amounts. That is, the electric utility cities were 
burdened with substantially more tax-exempt property than the nonelectric utility cities. For FY 83, for instance, 
before the homestead exemption was broadened to a blanket $25,000 for all resident property owners, 43.
16 
percent of the total assessed value of property in the electric utility cities was on average subject to some form 
of exemption: homestead, nonprofit, or governmental property.
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 In contrast, on average only 36.06 percent of 
the total assessed value of property in the nonelectric utility cities was subject to some exemption. And the 
difference of 7.1 percent was significant at the .05 level as seen in Table 1. The mean assessed value of the 
taxable property in the electric cities for FY 83 was $23,079 per capita compared to the nonelectric cities' 
amount of $36,006. The difference of means was also significant at the .05 level. 
 
Thus, far from being a simple substitute for property tax payments by individuals, utility transfers seem, instead, 
to be used as a substitute for a weaker property tax base. The electric utility cities seem to have overcome the 
revenue constraints of their relatively lower tax bases without reducing expenditures or increasing their millage 
rates by relying on utility transfers. The evidence is especially clear in the examples of two of the electric utility 
cities: Gainesville, home of the largest university in the state; and Tallahassee, the state capital and home of two 
major state universities as well as many nonprofit agencies.
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 In each case, electric utility fund transfers 
facilitate avoidance of the financial problems associated with a tax base depleted by significant amounts of 
exempt property. 
 
The most likely explanation as to why the electric cities have more tax exempt property than the nonelectric 
group is related to the very reason why some cities own their electric utilities while others do not: history. The 
cities of Florida and other states that were in existence in the Progressive Era adopted electric utility ownership 
as a reform alternative to dependence upon inefficient, and sometimes corrupt, private firms.
17
 That option 
usually disappeared as the private companies grew larger, became more efficient, and fell under the regulation 
of state utility commissions. Thus, newly incorporated cities have not had the option nor seen the need to get 
into the electric business. 
 
The Florida cities that today have electric utilities are primarily older cities in the north and central regions of 
the state that were originally settled and incorporated in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These 
cities, with a few exceptions, have generally not had the rapid growth, non-resident holdings, or land value 
increases seen in the many new and suburban cities in south Florida along the coastline. Consequently, the 
property of electric cities has been more affected by the tax-exempt status given to residents with property 
values of $25,000 and under. The newer, nonelectric cities also have not historically had much government, 
educational, and nonprofit centers since many of these establishments were located in older cities before the 
growth that has occurred since the 1950s. Since many other cities outside of Florida also acquired their electric 
utility status in the early part of this century, it is quite possible that similar kinds of differences between electric 
and nonelectric cities may be found in other states. While they may not have the large homestead exemption, 
electric cities in other states may also have lower land values and more tax-exempt property as compared with 
their newer, nonelectric counterparts. Further study is needed to see the extent of this phenomenon in other 
states. 
 
DISCUSSION 
We have seen that electric utilities provide a substantial amount of local revenue for a number of Florida cities. 
However, the availability of that revenue has not led to lower average property tax rates nor higher levels of 
expenditure. Instead, utility transfers have been used as a substitute for substantial tax exemptions. Therefore, 
we cannot characterize the use of transfers as either an expenditure effect or a simple revenue substitution. 
 
How, then, shall we characterize the use of utility transfers? A more complex and interesting rationale given for 
large transfers by some city officials, and one that seems to fit the present case, is that the utility fee is a method 
of ensuring that all city government "consumers" pay for services and facilities. Those that do not contribute 
directly through property taxes include: 
 
 Property owners whose property is assessed at less than $25,000, since the Florida Supreme Court 
awarded all resident property holders 100 percent homestead exemption on all property values of 
$25,000 or less in 1983; 
 Property owners who have received a total disability exemption; 
 Government and nonprofit institutions that have tax exempt status; and 
 Commuters and citizens outside of the city limits who use city services and facilities, but do not 
contribute toward their provision since the Florida constitution does not allow a municipal income (or 
commuter) tax. 
 
As a result of such exemptions, an argument could be made that many citizens and institutions make fairly 
negligible contributions to city coffers, though their use of services may be equal to or higher than that of those 
subject to the property tax. In such cases, reliance on utility transfers allows cities to recoup payment for 
services since many of these exempt service recipients, including government facilities and those living outside 
the city limits but in the electric service district, still make electric utility payments. In such cases, then, the 
most appropriate characterization of the use of utility transfer funds may be that of a "minimum tax." In effect, 
the utility can be viewed as a "minimum tax collector" through its electric rates that are, obviously, much higher 
than they need to be to cover service, fuel, and administrative costs. One major exception to this tax principle is 
the case of the city of Gainesville, which provides other city services to the tax-exempt University of Florida 
and copes with its negative externalities, but cannot benefit fiscally via electricity sales to the university, since a 
private utility sells power to the campus. 
 
Other states may have differing expenditure and revenue patterns, but this study suggests that utility profits can 
have more than just the simple tax or spending effects that previous studies have found. In some circumstances, 
officials may use the utility transfers to compensate for a weak tax base. Since many cities in other states face a 
tax base problem, it is likely that they are also taking advantage of their electric utility ownership in similar 
ways. We can also speculate that with fiscal strain, cities are more likely to use utility profits either to develop a 
minimum tax strategy (especially where no municipal income tax exists) or to use the profits as a substitute for 
the unpopular property tax. 
 
While utility profits may appear to local officials to be a useful method of revenue diversification, it must be 
noted that few cities currently have the opportunity to enter this service area, to either generate or distribute 
electricity. Private investor-owned utilities (IOU's) and regional public utilities are seldom motivated to allow 
municipals to operate where other firms have been established. In addition, few inefficiencies and corruption 
scandals have plagued contemporary private utility companies to the extent found earlier in this century. Thus, 
the public has not demanded better and less expensive services as a rationale for forcing public ownership. 
 
While transfers may relieve fiscal strain for current electric utility cities, such use of utility profits raise a 
number of critical questions. For instance, to what extent is reliance on the utility "tax" influencing the 
economic choices of citizens and firms, especially in comparison to the property tax? How are utility rates 
adjusted when cities rely heavily on utility profits to supplement the general fund? Does this method of raising 
revenue contribute to citizen fiscal illusion about services and/or revenues? And what is the impact of reliance 
on utility transfers for non-residents who pay for utilities as consumers of a monopoly service, yet have no 
political voice in the city government? Based on existing research and theory, we might expect that such use of 
utility profits cost high energy consumers more than low energy consumers, increase utility rates, promote fiscal 
illusion, and limit the fiscal-political voice of non-resident consumers. Verification of these expectations, 
however, will require further research. What is necessary in the public finance and urban public policy literature 
is an increasing awareness of the importance of electric utilities in those cities that own them, and the broader 
issues that ownership raises. 
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